United Nations S/2006/13

Security Council

Distr.: General
9 January 2006

Original: English

Letter dated 5 January 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I enclose herewith the text of the letter I delivered to your predecessor on 16 December 2005 (see annex). I would ask that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Allan **Rock**

06-20411 (E) 110106

Annex to the letter dated 5 January 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am writing to you in your capacity as President of the Security Council and on behalf of the Government of Canada to ask that the Security Council place the situation in northern Uganda on its agenda for immediate consideration.

The humanitarian situation in northern Uganda is nothing short of catastrophic, with 1.7 million displaced persons confined to over 200 squalid and unsafe camps. Over 90 per cent of the rural population of northern Uganda endures those unimaginable conditions and some have done so for almost 10 years. The principal cause of the displacement is the violent conflict that has plagued northern Uganda for almost 20 years, and in which the insurgent group, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), has attacked the population, raided the camps and abducted over 25,000 children, who have then been forced into fighting or sexual slavery. The abductions continue regularly.

Each week, 1,000 civilians die from war-related causes. More than 300,000 displaced children under the age of 5 suffer from malaria, pneumonia, diarrhoea and other preventable diseases. Up to 40,000 older children are forced from either their homes or the camps to commute each night to the relative safety of regional town centres to avoid abduction.

While the displaced persons are receiving life-saving humanitarian assistance from the World Food Programme (WFP), WFP has a funding gap of $23 million, representing an immediate shortfall of over 43,000 tons of food commodities. Unless new contributions are confirmed, the nutritional status of the displaced persons — and especially women, children and the elderly — will be at risk.

Insecurity throughout northern Uganda makes it difficult for aid agencies to gain access to areas in dire need of relief. Recent acts of violence against aid agencies have forced many to suspend or seriously curtail their efforts. In recent weeks, operating agencies — including those of the United Nations — have been forced to add new restrictions to their operations in the area.

The request that the Security Council place the issue of northern Uganda on its agenda is made on two separate but related grounds, as set out below.

1. Regional peace and security

There is a serious and growing threat to regional peace and security, as LRA brings its violence, its abductions and the threats and fear they spawn into neighbouring countries. LRA has long taken refuge in the south of Sudan, and its violence in that area during recent months has interrupted the return of refugees and displaced persons who want to go back to their homes following the peace agreement that ended the war in the south of Sudan. LRA has also disrupted the delivery of humanitarian assistance in that region.

More recently, LRA entered the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, an area already afflicted with a variety of violent militias. When the President of Uganda publicly threatened to take action as a result, the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations described those statements as "a threat to international peace and security".

The situation in northern Uganda is certainly having an impact on regional stability. Notably, its cross-border dimensions are having an impact on two countries where the Security Council is already actively seized: the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan.

In sum, the situation in Uganda not only represents a massive and compelling humanitarian emergency; it also constitutes a violent conflict that threatens regional peace and security in an area that is one of the most fragile and troubled in the world.

2. The protection of civilians

In paragraph 16 of its resolution 1265 (1999), the Security Council expressed its willingness to respond to situations of armed conflict where civilians were being directly targeted or humanitarian assistance to civilians was being deliberately obstructed. That intention was also expressed in paragraphs 10 and 12 of resolution 1296 (2000), which stressed the imperative for safe and unhindered humanitarian access to civilian populations and for appropriate measures to ensure the safety and security of such staff. In addition, in paragraph 14 of the same resolution, the Security Council invited the Secretary-General to bring to its attention situations in which refugees and internally displaced persons were vulnerable to the threat of harassment and made clear that, where such situations constituted a threat to the peace, it would consider an appropriate response, including the provision of support to the affected State where feasible.

As cited in the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council of 9 February (A/59/695-S/2005/72), the continued recruitment and use of child soldiers by LRA, the Ugandan People's Defence Forces and by the local defence units is also of grave concern. In paragraph 5 (c) of resolution 1539 (2004) on the situation of children in armed conflict, the Council expressed its intention to consider imposing graduated or targeted measures, through country-specific resolutions, on parties that continued to recruit and use child soldiers, failed to enter into dialogue and failed to meet their action plan commitments under the resolutions adopted on children and armed conflict. In its resolution 1612 (2005), the Council also mandated the creation of a monitoring and reporting mechanism on the use of child soldiers and formed a working group to monitor the reports of this mechanism and make the recommendations to the Council on possible measures to further promote the protection of children.

Steps the Security Council might take

We urge the Security Council to agree to place this matter on its agenda immediately, and to request a detailed briefing from appropriate sources. We also ask that the Council urgently consider taking the steps described below.

First, consistent with the aims of its resolutions on the causes of conflict in Africa, the protection of civilians in armed conflict, women, peace and security and children and armed conflict, we recommend that the Security Council adopt a resolution on the situation in northern Uganda, which should:

- Express deep concern regarding the threat to international peace and security and the humanitarian emergency caused by the ongoing conflict in northern Uganda

- Call upon all parties to ensure safe access to civilian populations for aid agencies
- Call upon LRA to surrender those individuals under indictment by the International Criminal Court to face fair and impartial trials by the Court
- Insist that all States in the region immediately cease any support for LRA and cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court
- Call upon all parties to pursue a peaceful and negotiated settlement to the conflict
- Call for tripartite talks between Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan to ensure a peaceful and coordinated response to LRA activity in the region
- Request the Secretary-General to engage in robust diplomacy with all parties on the situation in Uganda and to commit to ensuring that the Security Council remains seized of the matter and willing to draw, as appropriate, on the full range of instruments at its disposal should the parties not cooperate with the diplomatic efforts of the United Nations
- Call upon the Government of Uganda to provide legal and physical protection for internally displaced persons and refugees living in camps, consistent with international standards and its own national policies, including by deploying adequate troops dedicated to preventing attacks on these camps and ensuring the safety and security of humanitarian aid workers
- Call upon all States to respond to the severe humanitarian emergency affecting northern Uganda through an urgent allocation of funds for humanitarian services in affected areas

Second, through existing procedures, we recommend that the Security Council:

- Request regular briefings on the humanitarian, security and human rights situation in northern Uganda from the Government of Uganda, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, United Nations agencies and the Emergency Response Coordinator
- Commit to hold an Arria Formula meeting on the situation
- Recall the obligations of the Governments of the Sudan and Uganda to cooperate with and assist the International Criminal Court in its investigation of crimes against humanity committed in Uganda and southern Sudan
- Recall the obligations of the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda to assist the International Criminal Court in its investigation of crimes against humanity in Uganda as it relates to parties to the conflict present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- In accordance with its resolution 1612 (2005), apply the monitoring and reporting mechanism for violations against children to northern Uganda. The Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict should request regular reports of abuses carried out against children

I would respectfully ask, for all of the reasons and purposes set forth above, that the Security Council devote its attention at the earliest possible date to this tragic and threatening situation.

(*Signed*) Allan **Rock**

United Nations S/2006/14

Security Council

Distr.: General
11 January 2006

Original: English

Letter dated 9 January 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to forward herewith the text of an agreement, known as the Aden Declaration, signed by Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, President of the Somali Republic, and Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament, under the wise leadership of Ali Abdalla Salah, President of the Republic of Yemen, in Aden, Yemen, on 5 January 2006 (see annex).

The agreement is the culmination of three-day discussions between the leadership of the Transitional Federal Institutions, intended to resolve the difference of opinion among the members of the Transitional Federal Parliament of Somalia and, in particular, to find ways to reconvene sessions of the Transitional Federal Parliament of Somalia.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Idd Beddel **Mohamed**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative

06-20448 (E) 130106

Annex to the letter dated 9 January 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

ADEN DECLARATION.

Under the blessing invitation of H.E.Ali Abdalla Salah,President of the Republic of Yemen,a dialougue took place between H.E.Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed , President of the Somali Republic and H.E.Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden ,the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament of the Somali Republic , they held direct talks and dialogue which took place in Aden ,Yemen, from the second up to fourth January 2006;

The President of the Federal Republic of Somalia H.E.Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament of Somalia H.E.Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden:

Conscious of the primary importance of the national interest of the Somali people over any other issue;

Deeply behaving in the pursuance of the dialogue started under the auspices of H.E.Ali Abdalla Salah the President of the Republic of Yemen with the view of reconciling and solving the differences of opinion among the members of the institutions of the State;

Guided by the provisions of the Transitional Federal Charter of the Republic of Somalia;

Believing that all sacrifices and unlimited efforts should further be made to restore security and stability in Somalia;

Considering and showing full response to the relentless efforts of H.E.Ali Abdalla Salah,the President of Republic of Yemen to ensure the settlement

of all divergences which have existed among the Transitional Federal Institutions of the State ;

have agreed to issue this declaration, with the following provisions :

1. That both leaders have reached to start a new page and end their differences, which have brought serious damage to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of the institutions, in an spirit of cooperation on which the Somali people were spinning their highest hopes.
2. That both leaders have agreed the necessity that interactive coordination among the organs of the state should be based fully on the total respect of the principles and norms of the Transitional Federal charter, in a manner characterized by constant consultations and respect to the constitutional separation of powers.
3. That the Transitional Federal Parliament should be called upon for an official session that shall be held within 30 days from today, inside the country in a venue to be agreed upon.
4. That both leaders jointly call upon the members of the Parliament and Government to put aside their fruitless squabbles and differences, urging them to unite, placing the supreme interest of the nation above other interests, while appealing to them, for their full cooperation in fulfilling the provisions of this declaration.
5. That the International Community fully supports the efforts to convene the first ordinary session of the Parliament to be held inside the country.

The President of the Somali Republic and the Speaker of the Parliament of the TFP, address jointly a vibrant appeal to the Somali people to contribute towards the implementation of self-disarmament, putting to an end to their conflicts and differences using all peaceful means of mutual respect and dialogue.

They also appeal to the International Community to extend an emergency aid to areas and regions of Somalia which are now suffering from severe drought.

The President of the Republic of Somalia and the Speaker of the TFP, jointly address, on behalf of the Somali people, deep thanks and gratitude to H.E.Ali Abdalla Salah for the brotherly role he has displayed in a sincerely effort to solve the protracting crises that the Somali people had been confronted with.

The Speaker of the TFP
of the Somali Republic
H.E.Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden

The President of the Somali Republic
H.E.Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed

Done in Aden, on 5th January 2006;
at the 22nd May Presidential Palace,
Aden,Republic of Yemen.

United Nations S/2006/15

Security Council

Distr.: General
11 January 2006
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 9 January 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Lebanon is requesting the Security Council to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which ends on 31 July 2006, for a new period of six months, in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) dated 19 March 1978.

In this regard, the Government of Lebanon wishes to reaffirm the following:

1. The situation prevailing in the region makes it necessary to maintain the presence of UNIFIL and to extend its mandate, to the extent that Israel persists in undermining the provisions of resolution 425 (1978) which demands respect for the sovereignty of Lebanon and the establishment of international peace and security in the region, continues its violations of Lebanese airspace and threatens the security and integrity of Lebanon, despite your repeated appeals that it cease these violations, which the Security Council has described as persistent in its resolution 1614 (2005).

2. Considering the situation prevailing in the region, and as you indicated in paragraph 39 of your report (S/2005/460) dated 21 July 2005, it is even more necessary to maintain UNIFIL without change to either its mandate or its strength, as an essential aspect of this mandate as defined in paragraph 3 of resolution 425 (1978), the restoration of international peace and security in the region, has not yet been realized.

3. The Government of Lebanon is continuing the efforts it has undertaken to reinforce its authority in the south and for the economic, social and political revitalization and development of the region. It reaffirms its firm intention to preserve the security of the southern region where the Lebanese security forces continue to reinforce their presence in order to prevent acts undermining security, and, to that end, it coordinates its activities with UNIFIL and your Personal Representative for Lebanon.

4. The Government of Lebanon highly appreciates the contribution of UNIFIL to the de-mining operations intended to neutralize the hundreds of thousands of mines left by Israel on Lebanese territory, which have claimed dozens of victims, hinder freedom of movement of members of UNIFIL and prevent the restoration of vast portions of the territory. On this subject, Lebanon requests the Security Council to

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demand that Israel hand over the remaining maps showing the location of the mines which the Israeli army left on Lebanese territory.

5. The Government of Lebanon appreciates the sacrifices made by members of UNIFIL and thanks the States that have contributed troops to this Force. Moreover, it reaffirms its commitment to the Middle East peace process, whose goal is to establish a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the region, based on the relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), the principle of "land for peace" and the Arab peace initiative adopted in Beirut in March 2002.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ibrahim **Assaf**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations A/60/648–S/2006/16

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
11 January 2006

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixtieth session
Agenda item 19
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-first year

Letter dated 10 January 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government and further to my letter dated 10 November 2005 (A/60/554-S/2005/714), addressed to you, I have the honour to draw your attention to new violations of international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by military aircraft of the Turkish air force, recorded between 9 November 2005 and 4 January 2006.

On 9 November 2005, one C-130 Turkish military aircraft entered the flight information region (FIR) of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 11 November 2005, one formation of four F-4 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations.

On 11, 12 and 13 November 2005, one C-130 Turkish military aircraft and two CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The C-130 Turkish military aircraft, on 12 November 2005, coming from the FIR of Ankara, entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, from where it departed towards the FIR of Ankara. The same aircraft entered for a second time the FIR of Nicosia before landing at the same airport, from where it departed later towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) The CN-235 Turkish military aircraft, on 11 and 13 November, coming from the FIR of Ankara, entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where they departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara.

06-20485 (E) 130106

On 14 November 2005, seven NF-5 Turkish military aircraft coming in two formations (1X2, 1X5), one C-130 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The formations of NF-5 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Lefkoniko;

(b) The C-130 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, from where it later departed towards the FIR of Ankara;

(c) The Cougar Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus before landing at the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, from where it later returned to the illegal airport of Krini.

On 15 November 2005, two Cougar Turkish military aircraft and 13 NF-5 Turkish military aircraft coming in two formations (1X5, 1X8), violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The two Cougar Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying in a northerly direction before returning to the same airport;

(b) The first formation (1X5) of NF-5 Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the northern part of Nicosia and the occupied area of Mesaoria before returning to the same airport;

(c) The second formation (1X8) of NF-5 Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied areas of Kyrenia and Mesaoria before returning to the same airport.

On 16 November 2005, five formations (3X2 F-16, 1X4 F-4, 1X2 F-4) of 12 Turkish military aircraft and two CN-235 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, carrying out seven violations of international air traffic regulations.

On the same day, two formations (1X5, 1X4) of nine NF-5 Turkish military aircraft, one C-130, two C-160 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The two formations of nine NF-5 Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) The Cougar Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus before returning to the same airport;

(c) The C-130 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, from where it later departed towards the FIR of Ankara;

(d) The two C-160 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where they later departed towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 17 November 2005, two C-130 Turkish military aircraft and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The two C-130 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, from where they departed on the same day;

(b) The Cougar Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus before returning to the same airport.

On 21 November 2005, one B-200 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it later departed towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 22 November 2005, one Cessna Citation Turkish military aircraft, one Cougar Turkish military aircraft and one firefighter Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The Cougar Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it later returned to the illegal airport of Krini;

(b) The Cessna Citation Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara;

(c) The firefighter Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, where it remained.

On 23 November 2005, one C-130 Turkish military aircraft and two Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The C-130 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) The Cougar Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Kythrea before returning to the same airport.

On 24 November 2005, two Cougar Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Kyrenia before returning to the same airport.

On 25 November 2005, four F-16 Turkish military aircraft in one formation entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations.

On 30 November 2005, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The C-160 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it later departed towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) The Cougar Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied areas of Kyrenia and Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it later departed, returning to the illegal airport of Krini.

On 7 December 2005, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The C-160 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it later departed towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) The Cougar Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it later departed, returning to the illegal airport of Krini.

On 8 December 2005, two formations (2X2) of four F-16 and F-4 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, carrying out two violations of international air traffic regulations.

On 9 December 2005, two F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft coming in one formation from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations.

On 14 December 2005, one C-130 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it later departed towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 18 December 2005, one G/S and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The G/S Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Karpasia before exiting in a south-easterly direction, from where it later returned to the FIR of Ankara;

(b) The Cougar Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied areas of Kyrenia and Mesaoria towards the FIR of Ankara before later returning to the same airport.

On 19 December 2005, one B-200 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it later departed towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 20 December 2005, one Cougar Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it later departed towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 21 December 2005, one C-130 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it later departed towards the FIR of Ankara.

On the same day, one G/S Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Karpasia before exiting in a south-easterly direction, from where it later returned to the FIR of Ankara.

On 26 December 2005, one Gulfstream and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The Gulfstream Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations before exiting in a southerly direction;

(b) The Cougar Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the

national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it later took off and landed at the illegal airport of Krini.

On 28 December 2005, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating the international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it later departed towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 4 January 2006, one C-130 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it later departed towards the FIR of Ankara.

On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest the aforementioned violations and call for their immediate cessation. Turkey's policy of persistently breaching international law and defying international rules and regulations gravely jeopardizes the safety of international civil aviation and the stability of the region.

Moreover, Turkey's systematic attempts to undermine the sovereignty and unity of the Republic of Cyprus by promoting an illegal secessionist entity, arrogating, inter alia, to itself the right to have a national airspace, further complicates the efforts to build trust and confidence between the two sides and resume negotiations. Such actions are yet further evidence of Turkey's sole objective, namely to consolidate the existing division of the island and maintain thus its military presence in Cyprus in perpetuity.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 19, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Andreas D. **Mavroyiannis**

United Nations S/2006/17

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 January 2006

Original: English

Letter dated 11 January 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I wish to inform the Security Council of my intention to appoint, in accordance with resolutions 1595 (2005) and 1644 (2005), Serge Brammertz of Belgium as the Commissioner of the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission established following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. He will succeed Detlev Mehlis, who did excellent work in establishing the investigation and setting it on a firm and professional footing.

Mr. Brammertz is the Deputy Prosecutor for Investigations of the International Criminal Court. Before his election to that position he was the first Federal Prosecutor of the Kingdom of Belgium. He will proceed to Beirut to take up his assignment as soon as is practicable.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

06-20724 (E) 130106

United Nations S/2006/18

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 January 2006

Original: English

Letter dated 13 January 2006 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 11 January 2006 (S/2006/17) concerning your intention to appoint Serge Brammertz of Belgium as the Commissioner of the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission established following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, in accordance with resolutions 1595 (2005) and 1645 (2005), has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) Augustine P. **Mahiga**
President of the Security Council

06-20730 (E) 130106

United Nations S/2006/19

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 January 2006

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1615 (2005) of 29 July 2005, by which the Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) until 31 January 2006. It provides an update of the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, since my report of 19 October 2005 (S/2005/657).

2. My Special Representative for Georgia, Heidi Tagliavini, continued to head UNOMIG. She was assisted in this task by the Chief Military Observer, Major General Niaz Muhammad Khan Khattak (Pakistan). The strength of UNOMIG as at 1 January 2006 stood at 122 military observers and 13 civilian police officers (see annex).

II. Political process

3. UNOMIG, led by my Special Representative, continued its efforts to facilitate a sustainable dialogue between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides on the priority directions of the United Nations-led peace process — economic cooperation, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and political and security matters — as endorsed by the United Nations-chaired high-level meetings of the Group of Friends in Geneva (see S/2003/412, para. 3). Cooperation in these areas, complemented by activities of the so-called Sochi working groups implementing the agreements reached in Sochi in March 2003 between the Presidents of the Russian Federation and Georgia (see S/2003/412, para. 5), seeks to improve the confidence between the sides. By addressing practical issues, such cooperations aims to ultimately facilitate the commencement of meaningful negotiations on a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict, using as a starting point the paper entitled "Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi" and its transmittal letter (see S/2002/88, para. 3).

4. In pursuance of these aims, my Special Representative maintained her regular contacts with both sides to the conflict at the highest level and with the Group of Friends, including with the Russian Federation in its capacity as facilitator. In October, she met with the New York-based Group of Friends and, in Washington, D.C., with Ambassador Steven Mann, United States Special Negotiator for Eurasian

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Conflicts. Also in October, she met in Sukhumi with Mikhail Bocharnikov, Russian Ambassador-at-large. In November, she met in Tbilisi with Rolf Ekeus, the High Commissioner of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on National Minorities, and facilitated his visit throughout the zone of conflict. My Special Representative also facilitated a visit by the Tbilisi-based Group of Friends to Sukhumi in December for exchanges with the Abkhaz leadership on key issues of the peace process.

5. In her contacts with the two sides, my Special Representative focused on a package of draft documents on the non-resumption of hostilities and the safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons and refugees. During 6 and 7 December, she facilitated meetings in Sukhumi between the State Minister for Conflict Resolution, Giorgi Khaindrava, and the de facto Foreign Minister, Sergei Shamba. They reached an understanding on the package of documents and undertook to seek higher approval of the draft texts with a possible follow-on initialling and signature of the negotiated package of documents. Subsequently, the Georgian side reiterated President Saakashvili's readiness for a Georgian-Abkhaz meeting at the highest level to discuss without preconditions economic, humanitarian, confidence-building and security issues and possibly to sign joint documents. The de facto Abkhaz President Sergei Bagapsh did not exclude the possibility of such a meeting after a document on the non-resumption of hostilities had been initialled by the sides.

6. On 6 December, the first meeting of the Steering Committee for the Rehabilitation Programme in the conflict zone was held in Sukhumi, co-chaired by my Special Representative, the head of the European Commission delegation and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Resident Representative, opening a new chapter in the economic dimension of the peace process. The Georgian and Abkhaz sides, led by State Minister Giorgi Khaindrava and de facto Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba, respectively, and the Group of Friends participated in the meeting. Both sides agreed to actively cooperate in the implementation of the rehabilitation programme and to work towards ensuring the requisite security conditions. The rehabilitation programme is a joint effort by the European Commission, which will finance the programme, and UNOMIG and UNDP, which will be the primary implementing partners. The programme consists of two phases, to be carried out within the next two to three years, and is aimed at improving the living conditions of the local population most affected by the conflict through the restoration of basic services such as electricity, public health, water sanitation, waste management and agricultural development. It will also serve to build confidence and enhance security and stability in the area. The meeting marked the launching of the first phase of the programme, which amounts to an estimated 4 million euros and will include rehabilitation of the electricity, public health and agriculture sectors in the Gali, Ochamchira, Tkvarcheli and Zugdidi districts (see also S/2005/657, para. 30).

7. From 21 to 24 December, my Special Representative also facilitated a visit to Georgia by Walter Kälin, my Representative on the human rights of internally displaced persons. Mr. Kälin held discussions in Tbilisi and Sukhumi with the Georgian Government and the de facto Abkhaz authorities on ways to enhance the protection of human rights of displaced persons, in particular returnees to former places of residence in the zone of conflict.

8. On 19 November, I met President of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili in Tbilisi. I used the opportunity to reiterate the commitment of the United Nations to working closely with the Georgian and Abkhaz sides and the Group of Friends in search of a peaceful settlement to the conflict. I emphasized the need for both sides to observe the rule of law and respect the human rights and dignity of all individuals. President Saakashvili reiterated that there can be no alternative to a peaceful settlement of Georgia's internal conflicts, but stressed the inadmissibility of human rights violations on the Abkhaz-controlled territory, in particular in the Gali district. He joined me in commending the work of UNOMIG and my Special Representative in maintaining stability in the zone of conflict and in leading the peace process.

9. These developments took place against the background of an increasingly difficult and complex situation on the ground. The Georgian side was especially concerned over the security and human rights situation in the Gali district in the light of high-profile incidents, including killings. On a number of occasions, Tbilisi called on the international community to condemn what it referred to as human rights violations on the part of the de facto Abkhaz authorities and lack of action by the collective peacekeeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The promulgation of a new de facto law on Abkhaz citizenship exacerbated the apprehension and fear among the local Georgian population that those wishing to remain would be forced to renounce their Georgian citizenship. Conscription of ethnic Georgians into the Abkhaz military created further consternation among the local population. The Georgian side protested those actions and appealed to the international community to denounce what it claimed to be an attempt to establish faits accomplis prior to a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. For its part, the Abkhaz side claimed that the escalation of tension in the Gali district was due to allegedly renewed activities of Georgian partisan groups, cross-ceasefire line criminal elements and incorrect media reports. It also expressed concerns over increasing military expenditure and modernization of the armed forces by the Georgian side, including the opening of a military base in Senaki close to the Zugdidi restricted weapons zone.

10. In response to those developments, my Special Representative held discussions with both sides conveying concerns of each side over actions by the other, in particular the adoption of the resolution by the Georgian Parliament on the possible withdrawal of the CIS peacekeeping force from the conflict zone (see S/2005/657, para. 13), and the new de facto Abkhaz law on citizenship. My Special Representative addressed a weekly quadripartite meeting, which brings together the Georgian and Abkhaz representatives, UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force to discuss security in the conflict zone and issued statements, urging both sides to render all necessary support to ensure objective investigations of each incident, and offering to convene a high-level Georgian-Abkhaz meeting in order to discuss the deteriorating security situation.

III. Operational activities

11. UNOMIG military observers continued to perform their mandated tasks by conducting daily ground patrols, liaising with local administrations and law enforcement agencies on both sides of the ceasefire line and coordinating with the CIS peacekeeping force.

12. During the reporting period, no violations of the 1994 Moscow Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces were reported. The security situation remained generally calm, albeit with various incidents, mostly of a criminal nature, following a pattern similar to the same period in previous years. There was a rise in criminal activity during the first half of the reporting period, as seasonal revenue from the hazelnut crop began to flow into and through the region. Daily UNOMIG patrols conveyed a sense of presence and security; they responded swiftly to reported incidents, attempting to establish, as far as possible, facts in each case and advising the parties and the joint fact-finding group, which includes the two parties, UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force, of its findings.

13. The weekly quadripartite meetings continued to provide a forum for the two sides, UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force, to discuss security in the zone of conflict, including by seeking clarification on matters, such as the criminal situation, especially in the Gali district, the strength of respective law enforcement personnel on either side of the ceasefire line, and violations of the Gali Protocol of 12 May 2005 (see S/2005/453, para. 4) with regard to positions of law enforcement posts in relation to the ceasefire line.

14. The quadripartite meetings also tasked and monitored investigations of violent incidents. During the reporting period, the joint fact-finding group commenced seven new investigations into sensitive incidents with the potential to destabilize the situation in the zone of conflict. It is awaiting the closure of two cases, the discovery of a body at a CIS peacekeeping checkpoint north of Potzkhoetseri on 21 April 2005, and the detonation of an explosive device at Tagiloni on 27 November 2005 (see para. 15) in the security zone. The case relating to the detention of 19 woodcutters in the Gali district (see S/2005/657, para. 17) was closed during this period.

Gali sector

15. The military situation in the Gali sector remained generally stable but affected by violent incidents. The de facto Abkhaz State Security Service increased its presence in the security zone by establishing three additional but temporary posts, which were later removed. During the reporting period, 17 shootings, 8 killings, 6 abductions and 27 armed robberies were recorded. The number of shootings and killings increased significantly since the previous reporting period, while the number of armed robberies and abductions decreased slightly. On 2 November, the Abkhaz militia arrested and severely beat a Georgian resident of Gagida in the lower Gali district; he later died in a Sukhumi hospital. The detonation of apparently remotely controlled explosive devices, targeting a de facto Abkhaz taxation representative on 27 November in Tagiloni and the de facto Abkhaz head of administration of Repo Etseri on 18 December, were among the serious attacks. Other serious incidents included the killing of the Abkhaz de facto chief of security of the Inguri hydropower station on 11 December near the ceasefire line, abduction and killings of an Abkhaz militia member and a local resident during November at Tagiloni, a car ambush in Chuburkhindzi close to the ceasefire line on 13 November that killed one person, as well as two attacks on the Abkhaz de facto militia post in Pirveli Otobaya on 11 and 15 December, in the lower Gali district. On 27 December, an armed group opened fire on a minivan with civilians and two Abkhaz militia personnel near Gagida in the lower Gali district. In an exchange of fire, one of the perpetrators was killed. The repeated targeting of Abkhaz officials and the use of

relatively sophisticated explosive devices are a recent development and a matter of concern. These crimes also highlight the need for more efficient law enforcement in the area.

16. In addition, two separate anti-tank landmine incidents at a mandarin plantation at Kokhora village, north of Gali city, on 4 and 16 November, resulted in the death of a farm worker and injuring of four others, including a 12-year old boy. UNOMIG patrols investigated the incidents and concluded that the mines had been recently laid to deter workers and disrupt the harvest. It is believed that those criminal acts were a result of a local feud and that there was no direct threat to UNOMIG patrols.

Zugdidi sector

17. The military situation in the Zugdidi sector remained generally calm. During the reporting period, four shooting incidents, five robberies and one abduction were recorded. Compared to the previous reporting period, the number of shooting incidents has increased, while the number of robberies and abductions has decreased. Six demonstrations were also recorded, which is a significant increase on the previous reporting period.

18. Relations between the Georgian side and the CIS peacekeeping force on the ground seemed to be affected by political developments; demonstrations by Georgian students against the CIS peacekeeping force at its headquarters in the Zugdidi sector and at the main Inguri river bridge on 25 November were widely covered by the media.

19. During the reporting period, the CIS peacekeeping force removed one of its checkpoints from the main road, the M27, and deployed its personnel on mobile patrolling in the same area.

Kodori Valley

20. The situation in the Kodori Valley remained unchanged. On 9 December, UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force conducted a joint patrol in the Abkhaz-controlled lower Kodori Valley and reported the situation there as calm. UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force also jointly repaired the road in the lower Kodori Valley. UNOMIG continues to discuss with the Georgian side sufficiently robust security guarantees for the resumption of patrolling in the upper Kodori Valley.

IV. Policing issues

21. The UNOMIG police component continued to operate on the Zugdidi side of the ceasefire line and to maintain good cooperation with local law enforcement agencies. The de facto Abkhaz authorities remained reluctant to allow the deployment of UNOMIG police on the Gali side of the ceasefire line, which continued to hamper cross-ceasefire line cooperation, hinder progress in criminal investigations and limit the effectiveness of preventive anti-crime efforts.

22. UNOMIG police, however, continued to contribute to weekly quadripartite meetings and investigations of the joint fact-finding group, including by providing expert assistance.

23. During the reporting period, UNOMIG police continued on-the-job field training for police officers on the Zugdidi side. In addition, its personnel and visiting experts held training courses on law enforcement and human rights issues, and facilitated forensic training for three Georgian police experts at the Turkish Police Academy. It also continued to participate in local working groups on crime prevention and assisted in community policing. With assistance from UNOMIG police, the foundation of an Association of Women Police in the region was launched. UNOMIG also handed over equipment donated by the Governments of Switzerland and Germany to local law enforcement agencies.

V. Cooperation with the collective peacekeeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States

24. Close cooperation between UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force continued through regular liaison visits, weekly quadripartite meetings, information exchanges and joint patrols. In December, the CIS peacekeeping force conducted a planned rotation of its personnel on the Abkhaz-controlled side of the ceasefire line. The CIS force also carried out minesweeping in suspected locations.

VI. Human rights and the humanitarian situation

25. During the reporting period, the United Nations human rights office in Sukhumi continued to implement the programme for the protection and promotion of human rights in Abkhazia, Georgia (see S/1996/284, annex I). The office gathered first-hand information from victims, witnesses and other reliable sources, and followed up on cases related to due process, citizenship, arbitrary detention, treatment of detainees, impunity, involuntary disappearances, arbitrary evictions and property rights violations. The office continued its regular visits to detention facilities, provided legal advisory services to the local population and monitored court trials.

26. Personal security in the Gali district deteriorated owing to increased crime and the inability of de facto local law enforcement agencies to provide adequate protection to residents and their property. Following the promulgation of the de facto law on Abkhaz citizenship and reports of the possibility of Gali residents being pressured to renounce their Georgian citizenship, the human rights office gathered information from the field, monitored actions and raised concerns with the de facto authorities about possible violations of article 15 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, according to which "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality".

27. The de facto Abkhaz authorities have still not agreed to the opening of a UNOMIG human rights sub-office in the town of Gali, which would enhance the ability of the office to protect the human rights of the local population, including returnees, in the zone of conflict.

28. In fulfilling its capacity-building mandate, the human rights office, in cooperation with local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), continued to implement eight projects funded by the Government of Switzerland, including a trust phone line for detainees in Dranda prison near Sukhumi, free legal aid for

vulnerable groups and awareness-raising initiatives on women's and children's rights. The office continued to cooperate with other international partners, including OSCE and the European Commission, in facilitating and promoting their human rights initiatives and activities aimed at building the capacity of the civil society in Abkhazia, Georgia.

29. United Nations agencies and international NGOs continued their efforts to assist vulnerable groups affected by the conflict on the Abkhaz side of the ceasefire line. UNDP received 990,000 euros from the European Commission for its part of the rehabilitation programme it is implementing with UNOMIG. UNDP also received $800,000 from the Government of Norway, which will complement the European Commission funds and focus on income generation through agriculture and the rehabilitation of drinking water and irrigation systems on the Abkhaz side of the ceasefire line. UNDP continued to support capacity-building of local NGOs carried out by the United Nations Volunteer Programme. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in partnership with the Danish Refugee Council, the Norwegian Refugee Council and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, launched a series of confidence-building measures that contain both protection and assistance activities aimed at the grass-roots level between the communities. With the support of UNHCR, the partners established field offices and began their activities, including the assessments for shelter and school reconstruction. The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation provided funds for UNHCR to purchase firewood and stoves for the 690 families (2,240 persons) of most vulnerable internally displaced persons in the Zugdidi collective centres as well as for 27 schools (3,800 pupils) in the Gali district.

30. The United Nations Children's Fund continued to provide rehabilitated schools with student and teacher supplies, as well as recreation kits for children. It also continued to supply vaccines and immunization equipment, essential drugs and maternity, surgical and emergency health equipment to Abkhaz hospitals.

31. The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) continued to bring together women's NGOs and leaders in order to raise awareness about gender-based violence and reproductive health, and to support women's legal rights in the areas affected by the conflict. UNIFEM allocated $80,000 to support activities that target youth, women and men, police, health-care workers, teachers and schools in communities in Gali, Ochamchira, Tkvarcheli and Sukhumi. UNIFEM continued to support women from Georgian and Abkhaz communities in the creation of an Abkhaz-wide women's information network, and to engage six communities from both east and west Abkhazia.

32. The United Nations World Food Programme, in partnership with Acción contra el Hambre, promoted community-based food-for-work activities among the rural vulnerable population. The projects focused on rehabilitation of basic agricultural infrastructure, such as cash-crop plantations and arable land, to upgrade livelihoods of poor households through improved land use and assets. They benefited 8,200 persons from 15 communities from March 2005 through June 2005. Total food distributed to the beneficiaries amounted to 940 tons of wheat flour, vegetable oil, sugar and iodized salt.

33. International NGOs, such as Première Urgence, Acción contra el Hambre, the Norwegian and Danish Refugee Councils and World Vision, continued to carry out small-scale rehabilitation and community development projects focusing on income

generation, support to youth clubs, and education. With funds from the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office, Acción contra el Hambre supported income-generating activities for 1,180 of the most vulnerable people and provided vocational training to 3,133 people in 15 communities on the Abkhaz side of the ceasefire line. With funds from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, it implemented 18 community projects assisting 10,800 persons. Save the Children opened its office in Sukhumi and began implementation of a project to prevent sexually transmitted infections/human immunodeficiency virus. The first of a number of trainings for health providers and other key stakeholders was conducted in December, and the renovation of the AIDS Centre in Sukhumi will begin in early 2006.

34. UNOMIG continued to mobilize funds from donors and implement quick-impact projects in the conflict zone.

VII. Support issues

35. Following discussions with the Georgian authorities, UNOMIG was allowed to resume flights at the airport at Senaki until 31 January 2006 (see S/2005/657, para. 32). The Mission continues to discuss with the Government of Georgia use of the airport by UNOMIG beyond that period.

36. The Mission continued to raise awareness among staff of United Nations rules and regulations on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse. Extensive training sessions have been conducted at all Mission locations. In addition, thematic workshops were held throughout the Mission during the commemoration and observance of the campaign against gender violence on 25 November and World AIDS Day on 1 December, respectively.

37. In view of its geographical location and the discovery of cases of the avian influenza in Europe, UNOMIG implemented recommended precautionary measures and formulated a preparedness plan for the pandemic.

VIII. Financial aspects

38. The General Assembly, by its resolution 59/304, appropriated the amount of $34,562,100 (gross), equivalent to $2,880,175 per month, for UNOMIG for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006. The assessment of these amounts is subject to the adoption of a decision by the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission.

39. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNOMIG beyond 31 January 2006, the cost of maintaining the Mission until 30 June 2006 would be limited to the monthly amounts approved by the General Assembly.

40. As at 30 November 2005, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNOMIG special account amounted to $13.7 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1.9 billion.

41. As at 30 November 2005, the amount owed for equipment costs totalled $78,475. Owing to the Mission's precarious financial situation, reimbursement of

contingent-owned equipment costs has been suspended since 1 October 2004 and continues to be in arrears.

IX. Observations

42. The United Nations remains committed to assisting the Georgian and Abkhaz sides in the search for a peaceful and comprehensive settlement. My Special Representative and UNOMIG, with the support of the Group of Friends, will continue their efforts to help the sides move forward in the priority areas — economic cooperation, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and political and security matters. While UNOMIG and the Group of Friends stand ready to support the parties, tangible progress in those areas and related confidence-building measures is contingent on the political will of the sides.

43. In an encouraging development, the Georgian and Abkhaz sides engaged constructively with the mediation of my Special Representative in exchanges on joint draft documents on the non-resumption of hostilities and the safe and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced persons, which hopefully could lead to a meeting between them at the highest level. The start of the rehabilitation programme in the zone of conflict opens new opportunities for constructive cooperation for the benefit of those who need assistance most. On the other hand, the precarious security and human rights situation in the zone of conflict, in particular in the Gali district, and the lack of effective cross-ceasefire line cooperation between the law enforcement agencies limited opportunities for progress in the peace process. Challenges to an environment conducive to safe and dignified returns need to be effectively addressed.

44. Both sides need to refrain from actions or statements that could damage emerging opportunities in the peace process. I urge again the Georgian side to take into due account the Abkhaz security concerns, and the Abkhaz side to effectively meet the security and human rights concerns of the local population and returnees to the Gali district. The reluctance of the Abkhaz side to implement the recommendations of the 2000 joint assessment mission (see S/2001/59, annex II) and the 2002 security assessment mission (see S/2003/412, para. 16) is not conducive to progress; Sukhumi should honour its previous commitments and allow the opening of a human rights sub-office in Gali, the education of local youth in their native Georgian language and the deployment of UNOMIG police officers in the Gali district, as endorsed by the Security Council.

45. The freedom of movement, including entry and exit, of UNOMIG personnel in fulfilling their mandated tasks must be respected by all sides. The security of UNOMIG is of continuous concern, and the sides should ensure the safety of UNOMIG personnel at all times. I urge them to identify and prosecute the perpetrators of criminal acts against UNOMIG personnel, including the ambush of a UNOMIG bus in Sukhumi in September 1998, the shooting down of a UNOMIG helicopter in the Kodori Valley in October 2001 and various hostage-taking incidents. Regular patrolling in the Kodori Valley remains an essential part of UNOMIG's mandate, and cooperation in security-related matters and provision of effective security guarantees are key for its resumption.

46. The implementation of the first phase of the rehabilitation programme should increase the number of project activities in the zone of conflict. The sides should

effectively support its implementation, cooperate and ensure the security and safety of those involved, including UNOMIG, UNDP, the European Commission and UNHCR.

47. I remain convinced that the presence of UNOMIG remains critical for maintaining stability on the ground, advancing the peace process in the priority directions, and ultimately promoting a peaceful and comprehensive settlement of the conflict. Therefore, I recommend an extension of the UNOMIG mandate for a further period of six months, until 31 July 2006.

48. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Heidi Tagliavini, to the Chief Military Observer, Major General Niaz Muhammad Khan Khattak, and to all the men and women of UNOMIG for their tireless and courageous work in a difficult and often dangerous environment, and for their dedication to searching for a peaceful and lasting solution to this conflict.

Annex

Countries providing military observers and police personnel (as at 1 January 2006)

Country	*Military observers*
Albania	3
Austria	2
Bangladesh	7
Croatia	1
Czech Republic	5
Denmark	5
Egypt	4
France	3
Germany	12
Greece	5
Hungary	7
Indonesia	4
Jordan	8
Pakistan	10*
Poland	5
Republic of Korea	7
Romania	2
Russian Federation	3
Sweden	3
Switzerland	4
Turkey	5
Ukraine	5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7
United States of America	2
Uruguay	3
Total	**122**

* Including the Chief Military Observer.

Country	*Police personnel*
Germany	3
Ghana	1
Hungary	1
India	1
Poland	2
Russian Federation	2
Switzerland	1
Total	**11**


The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
GEORGIA
TURKEY
Caucasus Mountains
Black Sea
AJARIA
UNOMIG DEPLOYMENT
DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA MONUG
РАЗВЕРТЫВАНИЕ МООННГ
DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNOMIG
HQ UNOMIG Mission HQ
HQ Gali Sector HQ
HQ Zugdidi Sector HQ
LO Tbilisi Liaison office
Team base (closed)
Security zone (SZ)
Restricted weapons zone (RWZ)
Gali
Zugdidi
Kahati
Anaklia
Tbilisi
Sukhumi
Gudauta
Gagra
Gantiadi
Pitsunda
Novyy Afon
Ochamchira
Gulripshi
Dranda
Batumi
Kobuleti
Khobi
Senaki
Poti
Kutaisi
Zestaponi
Khashuri
Gori
Mtskheta
Akhaltsikhe
Marneuli
Okumi
Tsalenjikha
Lentekhi
Mestia
Ambrolauri
Akhalgori
Dusheti
Batumi
Atsquri
Ozurgeti
Supsa
Pot
Tqibuli
Passanauri
Kvareli
Telavi
Sighnaghi
Lagodekhi
Zemo-Bargebi
Nabakevi
Pichori
Ganmukhuri
Tsaishi
Ureki
Kvariati
Sarpi
Akhalsopeli
Vale
Khulo
Atsquri
Borjomi
Bakhmaro
Ozurgeti
Chokhatauri
Ozurgeti
Kobuleti
Khulo
Akhaltsikhe
Vale
Atsquri
Borjomi
Khashuri
Gori
Mtskheta
Tbilisi
Marneuli
Akhalgori
Dusheti
Ambrolauri
Mestia
Lentekhi

United Nations A/ES-10/315–S/2006/20

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
13 January 2006

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-first year

Identical letters dated 13 January 2006 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

The situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, continues to deteriorate due to the Israeli military assault being carried out against the Palestinian people. Over the past several days, the Israeli occupying forces have laid siege on the West Bank town of Jenin, preventing residents from freely moving into and out of the city while carrying out repeated military invasions against the Palestinian civilian population. The siege, which has strictly barred the Palestinian residents of Jenin from leaving or reaching other nearby towns and villages, came during the Muslim holiday of Eid Al-Adha, when Muslims traditionally spend the day visiting family and friends. Today, the siege continues, and Israeli occupying forces, backed by over 30 military vehicles and an armed bulldozer, entered the Jenin refugee camp and killed two Palestinian civilians. During the same incursion, Israeli occupying forces forcibly entered and ransacked several Palestinian homes, detaining a number of Palestinians.

In addition, the Israeli occupying forces have further tightened the closures imposed on the northern areas of the West Bank from the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, preventing Palestinian residents from travelling to Ramallah and areas in the south. The travel ban, which has been imposed by the occupying forces since the second week of December 2005, has affected over 800,000 Palestinians of the West Bank cities of not only Jenin, but also Tulkarem and Nablus and their surrounding villages. As of 2 January 2006, the ban applied only to Palestinians residing in Jenin and Tulkarem. However, since then, it has been extended to Palestinians residing in Nablus. This travel ban constitutes a blatant form of collective punishment against the civilian Palestinian population, an action strictly prohibited under international humanitarian law. This siege has not only isolated the Palestinian people from the outside world, but has also immobilized them even within their towns and villages, preventing them from carrying out even the most basic daily activities. This siege has gravely intensified the socio-economic hardships being suffered by the entire Palestinian population.

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As the Israeli occupying forces continue to commit breaches of international law and human rights violations against the Palestinian people on a daily basis, they seriously risk further aggravating the already tense and grave situation on the ground in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. Measures must be undertaken to ensure that Israel complies with international law, including international humanitarian law, and all other existing agreements signed between the two sides. Only under such conditions can the situation be prevented from further and irreparably deteriorating and can a climate truly conducive to the pursuit of peace actually emerge and thrive.

This letter is in follow-up to our previous 228 letters to you regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 5 January 2006 (A/ES-10/314-S/2006/11) constitute a basic record of the crimes committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

Accordingly, in follow-up to the above-mentioned letters, it is my profound regret to inform you that, since our last letter to you, at least two more Palestinians have been killed by the Israeli occupying forces, raising the total number of martyrs killed since September 2000 to 3,806. (The names of the martyrs that have been identified are listed in the annex to the present letter.)

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Dr. Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

Annex to the identical letters dated 13 January 2006 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Names of martyrs killed by the Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem*

Friday, 13 January 2006

1. Motaz Abu Khalil
2. Ali Abu Khazana

* The total number of Palestinian martyrs killed by the Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000 is 3,806.

United Nations S/2006/21

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 January 2006
English
Original: French

Letter dated 11 January 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you the attached list of members of the Government formed on 28 December 2005.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Philippe **Djangoné-Bi**
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

06-20851 (E) 170106 170106

Annex to the letter dated 11 January 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

List of members of the Transitional Government

Prime Minister, Minister of Economy and Finance, Minister of Communication	Mr. Charles Konan Banny
Minister of State, Minister responsible for the reconstruction and reintegration programme	Mr. Guillaume Kigbafori Soro
Minister of State, Minister of planning and development	Mr. Antoine Bohoun Bouabré
Minister of Defence	Mr. René Aphing Kouassi
Attorney-General, Minister of Justice and Human Rights	Mr. Mamadou Koné
Minister for Foreign Affairs	Mr. Youssouf Bakayoko
Minister of Internal Affairs	Mr. Joseph Dja Blé
Minister of Agriculture	Mr. Amadou Gon Coulibaly
Minister of Mines and Energy	Mr. Léon Emmanuel Monnet
Minister of Construction, Urban Planning and Housing	Mr. Marcel Benoît Amon Tanoh
Minister of National Reconciliation and Institutional Relations	Mr. Danon Djédjé
Minister of Economic Infrastructure	Mr. Patrick Achi
Minister of Health and Public Hygiene	Mr. Kouadio Rémy Allah
Minister of National Education	Mr. Michel Amani N'Guessan
Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research	Mr. Ibrahima Cissé
Minister of Technical Education and Professional Training	Mr. Youssouf Soumahoro
Minister for the Civil Service, Employment and Administrative Reform	Mr. Hubert Oulaye
Minister of Transport	Mr. Kobena Innocent Anaky
Minister of Cooperation and African Integration	Mr. Mabri Toikeusse

Minister of Culture and Francophone Affairs	Mr. Théodore Mel Eg
Minister of Solidarity and War Victims	Mr. Louis André Dakoury-Tabley
Minister of Animal Husbandry and Fisheries	Mr. Alphonse Douati
Minister of the Environment, Water and Forestry	Mr. Jacques Andoh
Minister of the Family and Social Affairs	Ms. Adjoua Jeanne Brou Peuhmond
Minister for Combating AIDS	Ms. Christine Adjobi
Minister of Industry and Private-Sector Development	Ms. Amah Marie Tehoua
Minister of Trade	Mr. Moussa Dosso
Minister of Tourism and Crafts	Mr. Amadou Koné
Minister of New Information and Communication Technologies	Mr. Hamed Bakayoko
Minister of Youth, Civic Education and Sport	Mr. Dagobert Banzio
Deputy Prime Minister responsible for economic and financial affairs	Mr. Koffi Charles Diby
Deputy Prime Minister responsible for communication	Ms. Martine Coffi Studer

United Nations S/2006/22

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 January 2006

Original: English

Letter dated 13 January 2006 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities (see annex), which was adopted by the Committee under the no-objection procedure on 9 January 2006 and is being submitted in accordance with the note by the President of the Security Council of 29 March 1995 (S/1995/234).

(*Signed*) César **Mayoral**
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities

06-21084 (E) 250106

Annex

Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities

I. Introduction

1. The purpose of the present report is to provide a factual summary of the Committee's activities during the period from 1 January to 31 December 2005, in accordance with the transparency measures outlined by the President of the Security Council in his note of 29 March 1995 (S/1995/234). The last annual report of the Committee was submitted on 28 December 2004 (S/2004/1039).

II. Background information

2. Following consultations among the members of the Security Council, the Council agreed to elect the bureau of the Committee for 2005, which consisted of Ambassador César Mayoral (Argentina) as Chairman, with the delegations of Greece and Romania providing the two Vice-Chairmen (see S/2005/3).

3. On 29 July 2005, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1617 (2005). The scope of the mandatory sanctions measures imposed earlier by the Security Council remained unchanged; however, the resolution did provide more clarity regarding the measures and their implementation. The resolution provided an explanation of the term "associated with", in reference to association with Al-Qaida, Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, thus clarifying who can be subject to placement on the Committee's Consolidated List. The resolution reiterated the need for close cooperation and exchange of information among the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) (Counter-Terrorism Committee) and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Furthermore, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to increase cooperation between the United Nations and Interpol.

4. Security Council resolution 1617 (2005) also included a number of non-mandatory measures. Annex II of the resolution contained a checklist for monitoring sanctions implementation by States and in the resolution, the Security Council strongly urged Member States to implement relevant recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on money-laundering and terrorist financing.

5. The Security Council extended the mandate of the New York-based Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team for a period of 17 months, to be discharged under the direction of the Committee.

III. Summary of the activities of the Committee

6. The Committee continued its proactive approach to discharging its mandate and solidified its role in the fight against terrorism. During the reporting period, the Committee held 7 formal and 36 informal meetings at the expert level. The Committee continued its practice of holding informal meetings. In January, April,

September and October, the Committee considered its programme of work, based on resolutions 1526 (2004) and 1617 (2005), and the list of main issues to be discussed at informal meetings of the Committee. The Committee agreed to continuously update the work programme to allow for the highest degree of flexibility in its work.

Briefings given every 120 days by the Chairman of the Committee to the Security Council

7. On 25 April, Ambassador Mayoral held his first joint briefing with the respective Chairmen of the Security Council Committees established pursuant to resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004), in which he informed the Council of the current and future activities of the Committee and the Monitoring Team (S/PV.5168). The second and third joint briefings, with the Chairmen of the above-mentioned Committees, were held by Ambassador Mayoral on 20 July (S/PV.5229) and 26 October (S/PV.5293), respectively.

Recommendations contained in the second and third reports of the Monitoring Team

8. During the first months of 2005, the Committee considered in depth, in the presence of the Monitoring Team, the recommendations contained in the Team's second report, submitted by it in December 2004 (S/2005/83), with the aim of agreeing upon possible follow-up action that would further improve the effectiveness of the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime. In September and October, the Committee considered in great detail the third report of the Team (S/2005/572). The Committee agreed with a number of the recommendations contained in that report. Some of the recommendations were referred to the Counter-Terrorism Committee for further action and some to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 for its information. The Committee also identified a number of recommendations that would require further consideration by the Committee, such as listing and delisting issues. For the first time, the Committee decided to issue, as a letter from the Chairman (S/2005/760), its comments and observations on the recommendations contained in the third report. The Committee indicated that it found that the recommendations should be brought to the attention of all States as implementation of the sanctions measures could be significantly improved.

Written analytical assessment pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2004)

9. In order to comply with its obligation to submit a written analytical assessment of Member State implementation of relevant sanctions measures pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 1526 (2004), the Committee requested the Monitoring Team to assist it by providing a preliminary analysis. That analysis was submitted to the Committee on 11 July. The Committee found it to be a valuable source of information that allowed it to arrive at its own conclusions, which were reflected in its assessment (S/2005/761). The Committee submitted the assessment with the expectation that it would serve as feedback for Member States that had submitted their implementation reports. For the 46 non-reporting States, the assessment will hopefully be a source of inspiration.

Exceptions under Security Council resolution 1452 (2002)

10. The Committee continued to consider notifications and requests submitted pursuant to resolution 1452 (2002) on an expedited basis. The Committee also maintains and regularly updates a list of notifying States. During the reporting period, the Committee received 10 notifications from five States seeking exceptions to the sanctions measures in accordance with paragraphs 1 (a) or (b) of resolution 1452 (2002). Two States have each submitted seven notifications. This was a slight decline in comparison with 2004. One State notified the Committee about its intention to release a considerable amount of money for payment of legal fees and other basic expenses. The Committee considered whether the funds were in fact necessary for the proclaimed purposes and whether their utilization was within the scope of resolution 1452 (2002). The Committee also considered a request by Liechtenstein to make the list maintained by the Committee pursuant to paragraph 3 (a) of the resolution available to all interested Member States. After extensive consultations, the Committee did not grant that request. In a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Committee, Liechtenstein expressed its regret over the decision. At the request of Liechtenstein, the letter was forwarded to the Council for issuance as a document of the Council (S/2005/672). The Committee also received a notification concerning exceptions pursuant to resolution 1452 (2002) for an entity. That communication is still under consideration.

Revision of the Committee guidelines

11. In accordance with paragraph 18 of resolution 1617 (2005), the Committee focused on revising the guidelines for the conduct of its work, including by addressing listing and delisting procedures, and on implementation of resolution 1452 (2002) so that the guidelines could serve as a better tool for rationalizing its own work and for providing guidance to Member States in their implementation efforts.

Dialogue with States

12. On 10 January, the Committee met with a senior delegation from the United States of America and was briefed by Juan Zarate, Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crime, Department of the Treasury, and F. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State. On 13 May, the Committee was briefed by senior representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The briefing included presentations by Edward Oakden, Director, Defence and Strategic Threats, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Kevin Adams, International Organizations Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Matthew Rowe, Charity Commission. On 1 July, the Committee heard a briefing by Ronald Mollinger, Ambassador at-Large of the Netherlands and Jan Willem van den Wall Bake, Senior Coordinator, Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing and head of the Dutch Delegation Financial Action Task Force, Ministry of Finance. On 5 July, the Committee heard a briefing by the Ambassador of Australia for Counter-Terrorism, Les Luck. Representatives of the above-mentioned States provided detailed information on current efforts in their respective countries to implement the sanctions against Al-Qaida and the Taliban. Members of the Committee found that this kind of dialogue and direct interaction with Member States was a useful tool for further improving and enhancing effective sanctions implementation. The Committee and its Chairman

strongly encourage other States to benefit from the opportunity to meet with the Committee.

Special briefings

13. On 24 June, the Committee met with the European Union Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Gijs de Vries, who explained the European Union competences and efforts in counter-terrorism. Members of the Committee also benefited from the briefings given to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and to which they and experts of the Monitoring Team were regularly invited.

Improvements to the Committee's list and its dissemination

14. The Committee continued to update its consolidated list of individuals and entities belonging to or associated with Al-Qaida and the Taliban on the basis of relevant information provided by Member States. The list continued to be the key instrument for States to use in enforcing and implementing the arms embargo, the travel ban and the assets freeze against listed individuals and entities.

15. During the reporting period, from 1 January to 31 December 2005, the Committee decided to add the names of 28 individuals and 4 entities to its consolidated list and made one delisting. A comprehensive list of listings and delisting in 2005 is attached to the present report (see appendix). Following each update, the Committee issued a press release, circulated a note verbale and e-mailed the changes in the list to Member States. Currently, e-mails are sent to 342 contact points provided by Member States and relevant international and regional organizations. Member States have been requested to provide the Secretariat with designated contact points at their permanent missions to the United Nations in New York and at the ministry/agency principally responsible for the implementation of the sanctions measures. The Committee continues to stress the importance of having Member States supply such information if they have not already done so as e-mail notification allows for very prompt implementation of the sanctions measures. In accordance with paragraph 19 of resolution 1526 (2004), the Secretariat transmitted a hard copy of the list on a quarterly basis for the convenience of Member States. During 2005, the list was transmitted three times (SCA/2/05(03); SCA/2/05(10); and SCA/2/05(20)).

16. On 9 September and 20 December, the Committee approved extensive technical corrections to the list, based on the information provided by some States that had been reviewed and processed by the Monitoring Team. Three similar rounds of technical corrections are still under the Committee's consideration. The Committee also agreed to certain changes in the layout of the list, including by adding permanent reference numbers, the rendition of all names in their original language and the alphabetical reordering of the names on the Taliban section of the list. These changes will be implemented in early 2006.

Cooperation with Interpol

17. At the initiative of the Monitoring Team, the Committee substantively increased cooperation with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). In paragraph 8 of resolution 1617 (2005), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to further increase cooperation between the United Nations and Interpol. Similarly, a resolution adopted at the

Interpol General Assembly in September (resolution No. AG-2005-RES-05) allowed for the initiation of a number of practical steps to enhance cooperation.

18. Further to these requests, the Interpol and United Nations Secretariats, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team, elaborated a supplementary arrangement to implement the existing cooperation agreement between the United Nations and Interpol. The arrangement established that Interpol:

(a) Create a special Interpol international notice for persons on the Committee's consolidated list, which Interpol could issue at the request of the Committee to alert States that certain individuals are the target of United Nations sanctions and are, therefore, subject to an assets freeze, arms embargo and travel ban;

(b) Add a reference to any currently existing Interpol notice advising that a person is on the consolidated list;

(c) Provide nominal data, if available, about specific persons on the list to the Committee and the Monitoring Team, so as to improve the accuracy of the list;

(d) Add, upon the request of the Committee, names and related data regarding persons on the list to the Interpol database, which is accessible by Interpol member States;

(e) Process, to the extent feasible, available background information, which may be provided by the Committee on specific persons on the list, such as the statement of case by submitting Member States, subject to the guidelines of the Committee for the conduct of its work.

19. The first four Interpol-United Nations special notices were issued on 6 December. The notices are available to national authorities through their Interpol national central bureaus. Limited versions of the notices are also available to the public at the Interpol website (www.interpol.org).

20. It is expected that enhanced cooperation with Interpol will provide the Committee with better tools to fulfil its mandate more effectively and give States more effective means to implement sanctions measures.

Coordination with the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)

21. The Chairman strengthened direct contacts with the Chairmen of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540, in order to increase their appreciation for each other's work and avoid overlaps, in particular with regard to visits undertaken at the levels of Chairmen and experts, and also to increase the exchange of information before and after visits. Members of the Committee highlighted on many occasions the complementary functions of the three committees and the need for a permanent exchange of information among them.

IV. Monitoring Team

22. The Monitoring Team submitted an updated programme of work in January, which the Committee duly approved. This covered the remaining six months of the Team's mandate under resolution 1526 (2004) and, among other issues, emphasized

the need for the Team to coordinate its work with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate.

23. The Team continued to travel to all regions of the world, including a further visit to Afghanistan, and to take part in conferences in which it believed it could promote a better understanding of the sanctions and thereby improve their implementation. A representative of the Team also accompanied the Chairman on his visits to selected States.

24. On 30 June 2005, the Monitoring Team submitted its third report (S/2005/572), in accordance with resolution 1526 (2004). In that report, the Monitoring Team noted that Al-Qaida continued to evolve and adapt to the pressures and opportunities of the world around it and that the threat of a significant attack remained real. At the same time, the Team noted that there had been a revival of the threat from the Taliban, in particular in the run-up to the Afghan parliamentary elections in September 2005. However, the Monitoring Team also noted that the international consensus against Al-Qaida and the Taliban remained firm, helped by a common understanding of the high level of the threat and of the consequences of a major attack. States increasingly saw the advantage of making the Security Council sanctions regime as effective as possible, and more States had come forward with names for the list, or had suggested improvements to existing entries, and had reported on activity with regard to implementation. Nonetheless, the Team concluded that the combination of distinct sanctions had still not achieved its full potential.

25. Under resolution 1617 (2005), the Monitoring Team has been mandated to take on additional tasks, including developing a plan to assist the Committee in addressing non-compliance with the sanctions measures, to present the Committee with recommendations that could be used by the Member States to assist them with implementation, to encourage the submission of names and information for the list and to advise on the changing nature of the threat of Al-Qaida and the Taliban and the best measures to confront them.

26. In its programme of work under its new mandate, the Monitoring Team outlined its plan to gather and assess information on implementation by Member States of the measures by examining relevant information that was submitted by States not just to the Committee but also to other United Nations bodies, including the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the International Civil Aviation Organization, as well as through cooperation with such other international bodies as Interpol and regional organizations, and through its own independent research and direct contact with States.

27. The Team also undertook to explore with States the best measures to confront the changing nature of the terrorist threat, including by denying Al-Qaida and the Taliban the means to carry out their attacks. The Team intended to develop case studies concerning individuals and entities on the list by examining whether their assets had been effectively frozen and whether they had been truly prevented from travelling or purchasing arms.

V. Visits by the Chairman and members of the Committee to selected countries

28. Pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 1526 (2004) and paragraph 15 of resolution 1617 (2005), the Chairman and members of the Committee made two visits to selected States. The Chairman and his delegation also participated in two regional meetings on counter-terrorism issues. From 29 April to 9 May, the Chairman visited Germany; the European Union Institutions in Brussels; Turkey; and the Syrian Arab Republic. From 8 to 18 October, the Chairman visited Nigeria; the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna; and Chad. From 9 to 11 November, the Chairman participated in an international conference on combating terrorist financing, held in Vienna and jointly organized by OSCE and the United States of America; and from 29 November to 2 December, the Chairman's delegation participated in a regional workshop on the prevention and fight against terrorism and terrorism financing held in Buenos Aires. The outcome of the Chairman's visits to Member States was detailed in his briefings to the Security Council (S/PV.5229 of 20 July 2005, and S/PV.5293 and Corr.1 of 26 October 2005).

29. Visits to Member States continue to provide the Committee with useful information on how sanctions measures are being implemented. They also provide Member States with an opportunity to relate successes, best practices, assistance needs, and concerns with regard to the work of the Committee. The visits to international and regional bodies and the participation in their meetings and workshops allow for enhancing the capacity of the Committee to discharge its mandate and provide a venue for the Committee to disseminate relevant information to ensure a broader implementation of the sanctions measures. The Committee finds that such organizations play an important role in coordinating the efforts of their Member States, leading to more efficient sanctions implementation overall.

30. The Committee found it of particular relevance to learn more about the efforts made by countries with considerable capacity needs. It was clear to the Committee that more needed to be done in practical terms to assist Member States that were not able to implement the sanctions measures fully. The Committee and the Security Council needed to remain aware of the gap between the sanctions requirements that had been imposed and the actual capacity of a number of countries to meet them. The Committee was also frequently informed of concerns with regard to the due process aspects of the Committee's work, in particular with regard to listing and delisting. The Committee focused greater attention on Member States that had not submitted reports pursuant to resolution 1455 (2003), including through some visits to non-reporting countries. The Committee was assured that reports would be forthcoming from those Member States and it will actively pursue the matter.

VI. Future work of the Committee and pending issues

31. The Committee considers 2005 to have been an important year with regard to its work. The adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1617 (2005) gave a new impetus to the Committee's consideration of its guidelines, including with regard to listing, delisting and exemption issues. The Committee is thus addressing concerns raised by some Member States and international and regional organizations with regard to due process. The Committee believes that the forthcoming adoption

of revised guidelines will therefore serve as a much needed tool for the Committee and Member States alike.

32. The definition of the term "associated with" provided by the Security Council in that resolution will hopefully assist Member States in their submission of names for listing. The Committee notes that there are currently 204 individuals associated with Al-Qaida on its list. This is far too few. The effectiveness of the sanctions does not only depend on State implementation but also by ensuring that all individuals and entities who should be on the list are in fact on it. Over the past three years, the Committee has received the names of 137 individuals and one entity to be included on the list. The final decision in those cases is still pending as in many cases the Committee has not received sufficient identifying information or a clear statement of case describing the association of the individual with Al-Qaida and the Taliban. The Committee is also considering more than 150 technical corrections submitted by the Monitoring Team during the reporting period. The Committee is dedicated to a prompt resolution of these issues and continues to emphasize the need for further submissions of names and corrections to the existing data on the list.

33. The Committee also looks forward to the increased information that will be supplied to it through the checklist contained in the annex to resolution 1617 (2005). Member States are requested to submit the checklist by 1 March 2006.

34. The Committee continues to rely on the valuable support of the Monitoring Team and is looking forward to receiving its three further reports during the course of 2006. Previous reports have contributed greatly to the efforts of the Committee and the Security Council to continuously improve the sanctions measures and their implementation.

35. As noted above, cooperation with Interpol was increased significantly during the course of 2005. The Committee strongly believes that such innovative and practical steps will have a tangible effect in Member States. The Committee is dedicated to continuing to take such steps and to seeking new ways to ensure that implementation of the sanctions measures against Al-Qaida and the Taliban is further strengthened.

VII. Observations and conclusions

36. In the international effort to fight Al-Qaida and the Taliban and their associates it is of the greatest importance that there be a consensus among States about the gravity of the threat. In 2006, the Committee intends to further consolidate and strengthen what has already been achieved in the fight against Al-Qaida and the Taliban through the instrument of sanctions.

Appendix

Changes made in the consolidated list of individuals and entities belonging to or associated with Al-Qaida and the Taliban in 2005

A. Individuals added

Date	*Name*	*Press release*
28 January	Sulayman Khalid Darwish	SC/8300 28 January
17 February	Muhsin Al-Fadhli	SC/8317 17 February
16 May	Abu Rusdan Zulkarnaen Joko Pitono	SC/8388 17 May
29 July	Ahmed El Bouhali Faycal Boughanemi Abdelkader Laagoub	SC/8469 1 August
16 September	Abdul Latif Saleh	SC/8503 20 September
29 September	Abd Allah Mohamed Ragab Abdel Rahman Zaki Ezat Zaki Ahmed Mohammed Ahmed Shawki Al Islambolly El Sayed Ahmad Fathi Hussein Elaiwa Ali Sayyid Muhamed Mustafa Bakri Mahdhat Mursi Al-Sayyid Umar Hani El Sayyed Elsebai Yusef	SC/8516 3 October
6 December	Ata Abdoulaziz Rashid Dieman Abdulkadir Izzat Yasser Mohamed Ismail Abu Shaweesh Mazen Ali Hussein Kawa Hamawandi Isnilon Totoni Hapilon Rafik Mohamad Yousef Ibrahim Mohamed Khalil Lokman Amin Mohammed Radulan Sahiron Jainal Antel Sali Jr.	SC/8573 7 December
15 December	Sajid Mohammed Badat	SC/8588 16 December

B. Entities added

Date	*Name*	*Press release*
2 May	Lashkar e-Tayyiba	SC/8381 6 May
1 June	Islamic Jihad Group	SC/8405 3 June
15 July	Movement for Reform in Arabia	SC/8451 18 July
17 August	Al-Akhtar Trust International	SC/8475 18 August

C. Individual removed

Date	*Name*	*Press release*
24 October	Rahmatullah Safi	SC/8534 25 October